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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of ·Utah 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN HONEY CO., INC.~ 
Appellant, 
vs. 
MARION R. CRYSTAL, and 
DELSA N. CRYSTAL, his wife, 
Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 7243 
The Appellant, plaintiff in the lower Court, claimed: 
I. In the first cause of action a piece of property 3~~ 
rods by 10 rods under a tax sale of the property to Salt Lake 
City Corporation. Plaintiff herein acquired same by a deed 
from Salt Lake City. The tax sale was a sale upon a sewer 
assessment. 
2. In the second cause of action a right-of-way over a 
10 foot strip on the south of the same property which Ap-
pellant claims to own by virtue of the tax sale and supports 
the same by a deed from a former owner of the said right-
of-way under chain of title, see Exhibit H for the said deed, 
and Exhibit S, entry #24 where the grantor acquired same 
prior to Respondents. 
3. In the third and fourth cause of action Appellant 
claims a right-of-way over said 10 foot strip by reason of a 
prescriptive easement. 
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4. In the fifth cause of action Appellant seeks to estab-
lish a right of access by the crossing of the said right-of-way 
above to other property owned by Appellant for the pur-
pose of cleaning a ditch on same and also to establish Ap-
pellant's right to maintain said ditch at a certain depth and 
enjoining Respondents from interfering with said ditch and 
flow and also for damages accruing to Appellant by reason 
of the said Respondent blocking the natural flow and re-
fusing to permit Appellant right to clear debris from same, 
causing damage to Appellant's property. 
5. In the sixth cause of action Appellant seeks to re-
cover for damage sustained by Respondents' removal of 
gravel and hard surfaced material from the said right-of-
way. 
The said Respondents have a general denial to all 
causes of action and also claim to have been the owner and 
·entitled to possession of the property for more than seven 
(7) years. 
Respondents also seek to quiet title to the said prop-
erty and to enjoin appellants from claiming same or said 
right-of-way. 
From judgment for respondent on all causes of action 
and granting Respondents affirmative relief and extinguish-
ing any tax lien Appellant appeals. 
ERRORS 
FIRST CAUSE 
I. No evidence to support the findings, and findings 
·contrary to the evidence. 
2. Judgment is contrary to law and not supported by 
proper findings. 
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3. Refusal of Court to grant new trial. 
4. Giving Respondent affirmative equitable relief de-
claring tax sale void and extinguishing the tax lien. 
SECOND CAUSE 
5. Findings are not supported by the evidence and 
are contrary to the evidence. 
6. Judgment is against the law and not supported by 
the findings. 
THIRD AND FOURTH CAUSES 
7. No evidence to support the findings concerning ad-
verse use. 
8. No finding to support the Judgment. 
9. Judgment contrary to law and evidence. 
FIFTH CAUSE 
10. Findings contrary to evidence and no evidence to 
support same. 
11. Judgment contrary to the evidence and the law. 
12. Failure to find on two material issues. 
(a) Right of Appellant to maintain said ditch. 
(b) Right to enjoin Respondents from interfering 
with same. 
SIXTH CAUSE 
13. No findings to support the Judgment. 
14. Judgment contrary to the evidence and law. 
ARGUMENT 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
15-7-41 U.C.A. '43 provides: 
" 
0 ~ Such assessment and finding of benefits 
shall not be subject to review in any legal or equit-
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able action, except for fraud, gross injustice or mis-
take. (C. L. 17, S 679, 692.) 
The.legislature has spoken. The Court is without juris-
diction to review the matter render any judgment holding 
as the Court did in the case at bar. This is particularly true 
since it will be noted that Respondent did not bring itself 
within the exception by pleadings, findings of fact or other-
wise with respect to the exceptions noted in the statute, 
to-wit: fraud, gross injustice, or mistake. 
15-7-41 U.C.A. '43 is the same section as Comp. Laws 
of Utah 1917, 679-692, and the Supreme Court of this state 
has heretofore with respect to this section decided as fol-
lows: 
STOTT et al vs. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
151 Pac. 988 - 47 Utah 113 
" ~ ~ Assessments and finding of benefits shall 
not be subject to review in any legal or equitable 
action except for fraud, gross injustice, or mis-
t k ~ ~ , a e. 
"That is, it is not enough merely to show that 
some provision of a statute or ordinance (where the 
matter is not jurisdictional) has not been complied 
with, but ordinarily it must further be made to ap-
pear that the party complaining should prevail as a 
matter of justice and good conscience. This Respon-
dents have utterly failed to so do." 
" ~ ~ A failure, therefore, to comply with the 
ordinance, no doubt constituted an irregularity; but 
such an irregularity could not rob the council of 
jurisdiction. ~ ~ If such can be done now, then the 
Respondents have discovered an easy way to obtain 
an improvement which is beneficial to their property 
in the form . of a permanent sidewalk, without pay-
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ing for it or for any part of the cost of construction. 
In view that the omission complained of was not 
jurisdictional, Respondents cannot now avail them-
selves of the objection.'' 
"The authorities are very numerous, and prac-
tically unanimous, to the effect that where a tax-
payer desires to enjoin the collection of a tax levied 
to pay the cost of a public improvement for which 
his property is assessed he, except for fraud or col-
lusion, or jurisdictional defects, must move timely, 
and if any particular remedy is provided by law, 
must pursue that remedy. "" "" " 
'" "" "" The judgment in the case at bar, however, 
unconditionally relieves the property owners from 
paying anything, although there is not a particle 
of evidence in the record that the walk in question 
is worthless. # # " 
15-7-40 U.C.A. '43 
cell the owners of two-thirds of the property men-
tioned do not file such objections, the governing 
body shall have jurisdiction to order the making of 
the improvements mentioned in said notice." 
Here the legislature has prescribed the only way the 
city may lose jurisdiction. 
Respondents can show nowhere in the record that two-
thirds of property owners objected or that any one objected. 
Jurisdiction must be conceded. 
Appellant moreover has from the record shown a strict 
compliance with all state laws and even city ordinances in 
the sale in question, and this was not necessary under the 
Scott case supra. 
The findings paragraphs 7 and 8, R 57 and 58, are the 
only findings upon which the judgment awarded could 
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possibly be sustained. These findings are contrary to the 
evidence, see uncontradicted evidence Exhibits V, W and 
Y, E, V, D, A and R 68, 69. 
In the Branting case below, failure to have complied 
with any one of findings 7 or 8 would not in any "event rob 
the city of jurisdiction." 
BRANTING vs. SALT LAKE CITY 
153 Pac. 995 - 47 Utah 296 
" 
0 
0: After the law was amended, but without 
publishing a new notice of intention, the Appellant 
advertised for bids as required by the statute for 
the construction of the sewer in question, and the 
lowest responsible bid it obtained for the construc-
tion of the sewer amounted to $2.15 per front foot. 
O: O: where any taxpayer who felt aggrieved could 
be heard respecting the justness or validity or equal-
ity of the assessment and levy of the tax as afore-
said. The respondent did not appear nor offer any 
objection to the assessment and levy of the tax as 
proposed, and the tax was accordingly assessed and 
levied to the amount of $2.15 per front foot, which 
was in excess of the estimated cost, as before 
stated. 0 0: '' 
"Since the Legislature might have dispensed 
with any estimate, the failure of the council to make 
any would doubtless be held an irregularity which 
might be waived by a failure to protest." 
" 0: 0: While it is now well established that in 
levying special taxes all jurisdictional requirements 
must be strictly complied with, yet it is equally well 
settled that all statutory requirements are not furis-
dictional, and that a departure from the latter con-
stitute irregularities merely which must be timely 
objected to by the taxpayer or they may be deemed 
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waived. Courts may not add to the statutory re-
quirements, nor have they the right to declare an 
act jurisdictional which is not made so by the sta-
tute. 0 0 " · 
" 
0 0 We are of the opinion, therefore, that the 
District Court erred in holding that the estimate 
under our statute was jurisdictional, and that in 
levying the tax in excess of such estimate the Ap-
pellant exceeded its power or jurisdiction, and that 
for that reason the amount of the tax in controversy 
here was invalid." 
These cases hold that should the lower Court have 
been justified in making such findings as contained in para-
graph 7 and 8, R 57 and 58, which, of course, it was not, 
that still it is error to hold the tax sale· void. The Court was, 
therefore, twice wrong. First, in making such a finding 
contrary to the evidence, which evidence proved beyond 
all reasonable doubt that the contrary was the case. Second, 
the findings under the statute and the law cannot support 
the decree. 
Exhibit "S", the certificate in the abstract before entry 
28, shows ~e special sewer assessment. Respondents ac-
quired the property at entry 50 ahnost 14 years after saia 
assessment and notice of said assessment. At the time of 
the assessment and the sale the property consisted of a 
parcel as described in the certificate just prior to entry 28 
which included a single piece, part being in Lot 7 and part 
in Lot 8. The land in controversy in 1his litigation was 
under all tax notices and description~ part of a larger parcel· 
as a unit with its westerly bonndary abutting Pugsley 
Street, said westerly boundary being in Lot. 7. 
At the time of the publication of Exhibit "U", the ab-
stract, Exhibit "S" shows all the property outlined in green 
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on the plat to belong to the same person. Exhibit "U" had 
published thereon also Exhibit "A". Note the bottom of 
page 1 on Exhibit "A" shows the assessment to be on both 
sides of Pugsley Street and the plat shows the property to 
abut Pugsley Street, also Exhibit "A" shows in the center 
of page 2 that the assessment is to the "ENTIRE DEPTH." 
It also describes the property by lot and block. Exhibit 
"D" again describes the property as does "E", any one of 
which was sufficient notice, and since the property now 
claimed was included in that described. Under this evi-
dence paragraph 6 of R 57 is contrary to the evidence. 
When the assessment was levied the property was all 
owned by one person. This property abutted on PUGSLEY 
Street. It was part in Lot 7 and part in Lot 8. The prop-
erty was assessed for general taxes and the special taxes as 
a unit and as provided in the notice TO THE ENTIRE 
DEPTH, which included the very property at issue. Re-
spondents tried in the lower Court to make something of 
the fact that years after the assessment and tax sale the 
owner broke the land in two and deeded part to Respon-
dents. If such an ingenious, clever device could relieve 
property of a proper tax, for special assessment, all owners 
could deed one inch of the front of their property to some-
one and claim the balance of the back was free from side-
walk, sewer and street assessment. 
The Courts have recognized this and have uniformly 
held. 
HESTER vs. COLLECTOR OF TAXES 
217 Mass. 422, 105 N.E. 631 
"Where it appeared that, at the time of the pass-
age of the order for the construction of a sewer, 
the land assessed was one tract, it was held that the 
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fact that subsequently the owner divided the land 
into several lots and sold them to different persons 
did not prevent the assessn1ent of the land as a unit, 
since "the assessment when made constituted a lien 
upon the land covered by it, and this lien relates 
back to the time of the passage of the order." 
See also: 
JORDAN vs. CITY OF OLIVE HILL 
162 S.W. 2nd 229 
STATE vs. COMBS 
106 S. W. 2nd 61 
Exhibits "V", c'W" and "Y,, show notices were mailed, 
and there is no evidence to the contrary. These are not 
jurisdictional in any event and the evidence all shows that 
notices were mailed. Paragraph 7 of the findings, R 57, is 
not only unsupported by any evidence as is paragraph 8 , 
of the findings, but under Utah cases above cited these are 
not jurisdictional and cc constitute irregularities which must 
be timely objected to or deemed waived:" Such objection 
must be by two-thirds of property mentioned. 
15-7-38 U.C.A. ,43 
This section precludes any attack upon the sale unless 
same was made to governing body sitting as a board of 
equalization. 
The record is bare of any showing by Respondents of 
such an attack or complaint. 
15-7-38 above also provides: 
"THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW SUCH 
TAX OR PART THEREOF INVALID, INEQUIT-
ABLE OR UNJUST RESTS UPON THE PARTY 
WHO BRINGS SUCH SUIT.', 
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Respondents have failed to carry this burden and have 
failed to make even a prima facie case of jurisdictional 
defect or irregularity while Appellant has by overwhelming 
evidence shown the sale to be valid in every detail. Re-
spondents might claim that Appellant now takes an incon-
. sistent position in claiming under statutes quoted that the 
Court is without jurisdiction to declare the tax sale void 
and grant the relief given Respondents, and then quoting 
a section which mentions the word suit. Note, however, 
that as a condition precedent to the right of the Court to 
have jurisdiction or grant relief the section requires: 
1. Payment of the tax under protest. 
2. Notice of intention in writing of not only intention 
to sue to recover, but also a statement of the grounds and 
the grievance. 
3. Commencement of action within 60 days "But not 
later" after date of filing of written notice. 
Respondents do riot even pretend that any one of the 
above has been complied with, yet hope to sustain the 
Court's decree declaring the sale void and no reimburse-
ment on the flimsy findings of paragraphs 7 and 8. 
15-7-39 U.C.A. '43 
This section provides: 
c'Every person # tt who fails to appear before 
such board of equalization and review and make 
any and every objection he may have to such tax 
shall be deemed to have waived all and every ob-
jection to such levy." 
Respondents have shown no compliance with this 
section. Respondents have waived objections and the legis-
lature having spoken, the Court was without jurisdiction 
to grant the order entered. 
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The Court erred in not holding that Respondents 
waived EVERY OBJECTION and particularly when the 
record was silent of any objections being made by Respon-
dents at any time. The Court certainly erred in permitting 
the Respondents to enjoy all the benefits of the improve-
ments without any of the tax burden and even granting 
affirmative relief in equity enjoining Appellant from claim-
ing the land without requiring a reimbursement for Appel-
lant with respect to the tax lien. The cases on this are too 
numerous to require citations. The tax sale should be held 
valid. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
• Exhibit H is a deed from the Utah Oil Refining Com-
pany to Appellant. Exhibit "S", entry 24, shows that the 
said grantor of Appellant acquired the property through 
chain of title from a predecessor in the chain of title to the. 
said Resopndents. The said Respondents took the property 
subject to this right-of-way and the grantor of Appellant 
had the right to give unto the said Appellant by a deed 
said interest, which was done by Exhibit "H". R. 335 shows 
the attempt of the Respondents to vary this written instru-
ment by a parole which, of course, is contrary to law, and 
notwithstanding this fact R 338 shows definitely that the 
said grantor of plaintiff did take said deed for the purpose 
of maintaining a right-of-way and said grantor could, there-
fore, properly convey this interest to the said Appellant. 
Paragraph 3 of R 58 and 59 is directly contrary to the 
evidence and there is absolutely no evidence to support 
such finding, and paragraph 4 following is also contrary to 
the evidence shown in R 95 to 112 and 134 to 178 and 
378 to 429. 
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The evidence is almost conclusive of the continued use 
of the said right-of-way by many people, and even by a 
cripple who had no trouble going through same, and from 
the record as here disclosed there was never a time that this 
right-of-way was not used by all the people in the rear for 
more than twenty-one years. It is quite clear from the facts 
of the deed given as well as the adverse use that the lower 
Court should be reversed on the Second Cause of Action. 
THIRD AND FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION 
With respect to the Third and Fourth Causes of action, 
what has been said with respect to the Second Cause of 
Action with respect to adverse use is adopted as argument 
With respect to the Third and Fourth Causes of Action, and 
please also note from R 162 that the evidence is uncontra-
dicted of a prescriptive use of this property as a means of 
crossing in the year 1918. The defendant has no evidence 
to the contrary as well as all of the record above recited 
showing cripples, children and vehicles using said right-
of-way continuously and adversely. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
The evidence, R 100, a statement of a disinterested 
witness, discloses that the plaintiff was prevented from 
cleaning the ditch and R 166, and particularly R 170-171, 
230 and 231 of the record discloses that not only the plain-
tiff, but the defendant, at R 377-378 admitted moving the 
supporting walls arormd the ditch. A material issue before 
the Court to be determined was whether the ditch was 
upon the plaintiff's land or defendants' land, and whether 
the plaintiff had the right to maintain said ditch. The 
Court made no findings on either issue. Paragraph 4, R 60, 
is contrary to the evidence and not supported by the evi-
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dence, see R 100 and R 172. See also the finding of the de-
fendant itself in R 61, wherein the defendant admits re-
moving the gravel supporting the sides of the ditch. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
R 165 is uncontradicted and shows that Appellant paid 
for and hauled gravel on the driveway. 
That Respondents removed same to Appellant's dam-
age is even found in paragraph 2, R 61 of the findings, yet 
the Court finds for Respondents No Cause of Action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. L. SCHOENHALS, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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